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Gleaning: Old Name, New Practice  
 
Abstract: The practice of gleaning is linked to the centuries-old custom embedded in the customary laws 
of many peoples, according to which the master of the land holds the right to allow the poor to follow 
reapers in the field and to gather and glean the fallen spears of grain. In this paper, the new meaning of the 
practice of gleaning is analyzed by using an example of one Serbian village in Vojvodina province, Gaj, 
which is still predominately agricultural. In a strict sense, the name of the old practice is kept, but the 
essence of the practice itself and its symbolism have changed radically. In previous times, the term 
‘gleaning’ referred to the reciprocal social, economic and political relationship between the poor and the 
landowner. Today, in the context of the village of Gaj, it is mostly used as a euphemism for field theft. The 
paper analyzes this gradual shift in diachronic and social-anthropological perspectives, aiming to depict 
and explain crucial changes in informal and formal institutions that have contributed to this current 
understanding of gleaning.  
Keywords: gleaning, customary law, informal welfare, field theft, Roma, Vojvodina province (Serbia).  
 
Introduction 
Gleaning is linked to the centuries-old custom embedded in the customary laws of many peoples 
according to which the master of the land allows the poor to follow reapers in the field and to 
gather and glean the fallen spears of grain. One of the earliest agricultural laws of the Hebrews, 
described in the Old Testament, illustrates how the generosity of the master determined the amount 
of gleaned grains (The Story of Ruth 2:2-23). This early form of welfare for the needy is vastly 
widespread. In some places the old form of the custom is kept and involves the relationship 
between the landowner and the poor, while in other places different fate-based groups glean and 
redistribute leftover crops as part of their religious calling. Gleaning has also gained political and 
engaging connotations, particularly alongside the global development of capitalism and increased 
consumption (Edwards and Mercer 2007; Rush 2006).  
The focus of this paper is on the Serbian institution of gleaning (pabirčenje), which is analysed 
through diachronic change of institutions and empirical insights.1 Taking the village of Gaj in the 
south-eastern part of Vojvodina province in Serbia as an example, I discuss in detail how such an 
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ancient customary practice converted into its antipode. In other words, gleaning, as a relapse of 
customary welfare, instead of evoking associations related to charity, today rather represents a 
euphemism for field theft. Many factors have contributed to such understanding. However, two 
factors seem to be crucial and I will argue that the growing importance of the welfare state and the 
strengthening of private property have provoked such an outcome.  
The converted practice of gleaning acknowledges the opinions of many legal anthropologists 
who hold that different legal forms are not static but rather are actor-oriented and sensitive to 
dynamics and change (Turner 2015, 382).2 Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold. As it 
analyses modifications of the practice of gleaning, which belongs to the sphere of customary law, 
the first aim of the paper is to contribute to the scholarship on legal pluralism, which understands 
the law as an analytical conception and a comparable category in cross-cultural and historical 
analyses, taking into consideration not only variations within state or transnational law, but also 
various forms of normative orders and unofficial law (F. Benda-Beckmann 2002; Benda-
Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2006; Benda-Beckmann, Benda-Beckmann and Griffiths 2009). 
More concretely, this paper, with its attention to local ways of negotiating and questioning 
customary law, may provide a more nuanced approach to cross-cultural research and analyses of 
legal pluralism. On the other hand, the paper analyses in detail why actors have particular 
understandings of gleaning, and how they accommodate this practice to their personal needs. 
Sometimes their actions run counter to the normative and traditional understanding of gleaning, 
which creates completely new space for manoeuvring traditional norms, and for metamorphosing 
the institute of gleaning. In that regard, the second aim of the paper is to contribute to the 
scholarship on informal and informal practices in Eastern Europe, where, according to many 
authors, various informal practices have become routinised and normalised, particularly since the 
collapse of socialism as a consequence of failed economic and political reforms (Dunn 2004; 
Ledeneva 2006; Morris and Polese 2013; Harboe-Knudsen and Frederiksen 2015). 
The paper is roughly divided into two parts: theoretical and analytical. My theoretical 
approach, presented in the first section of the paper, starts from theoretical insights from debate 
about the impact of the welfare state in the process of crowding out informal welfare. In parallel 
with this, I observe diachronic developments of institutions of private property and the welfare 
state in Serbia. This is followed by the second analytical section, in which I present and discuss, 
apart from the local setting, actors’ understanding of gleaning and local strategies related to it.  
  
Debate on Crowding out Informal Welfare  
There is a great body of literature that analyses whether the modern state, known as the welfare 
state, has contributed to the dismantling of old traditional safety nets and customs. For the sake of 
simplicity, I shall refer to the latter as informal welfare, although not all such traditional customs, 
norms and practices have been exclusively dedicated to the support of the welfare of the 
community or the individual in harsh times. Some of them do not have an altruistic component at 
all, and their purposes might be quite diverse or purely symbolic.3  
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Informal welfare is to be understood as a spontaneously evolved and organized network of 
institutions (norms and customs) and practices whose aims are to share and mitigate risks 
(unemployment, natural catastrophes, drought etc.) and reduce the exposure to risk and existential 
vulnerability (such as poverty, famine, illnesses, growing old) between members of the community 
or family. From the earliest times, people have been developing different mechanisms for coping 
with and mitigating risks and hardship. Many of these mechanisms imply the sale of assets, saving, 
reducing consumption, migration, making alliances through marriage, sharing food, lending and 
borrowing in reciprocal relationships, diversification of crops and production, income 
diversification, volunteering, withdrawal of children from school and so on. The nature of risks is 
various and is caused by different factors. Existing literature distinguishes between idiosyncratic 
and common risks. Idiosyncratic or individual risks affect only a particular household or 
individual, while common risks are aggregate, economy-wide, covariate risks that affect all 
members of a community or region (Dercon 2002, 142). Due to the different effects of risks, 
idiosyncratic risks can be insured within a community, unlike common risks. In the latter case, 
everyone within a community is affected, and the consequences usually cannot be shared or 
insured among members.  
Alderman and Paxson (1992) offer two broad classifications of possible strategies to mitigate 
risk. The first is risk management that is based on anticipation of possible risk, and in accordance 
with that, activities are oriented towards prevention. In rural areas, this may include crop 
diversification, income diversification or possibly migration. The second is risk coping strategies, 
within which individuals and households develop different self-insurance strategies such as saving, 
accumulating assets or money, or storing goods and food, which enable a household or individual 
to spread the effects of risk over longer time periods. Risk-sharing is also considered to be a part 
of risk coping strategies. Risk-sharing rests on different group-based mechanisms that spread the 
effect of risk at any point in time. People apply various risk-sharing mechanisms in order to reduce 
the negative effects of risk, such as access to formal insurance schemes, or access to informal 
insurance arrangements like transfers, remittances, and different labour or land contracts between 
family and community members. It would be misleading to think, however, that people usually 
apply one of these two strategies: either risk management or coping strategies. They are often 
combined and used simultaneously depending on the amount of risk involved. 
All these varieties of coping and mitigating risks emerged and developed long before the 
modern state, and one topical theoretical debate considers whether the modern welfare state 
endangers informal ways of coping and mitigating crises. Two main approaches have been 
crystallized so far. The first approach advocates the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis. Scholars in support 
of this stance argue that crowding out of informal welfare appears as an inevitable consequence of 
the encompassing influences of the state, particularly those in the spheres of social security. 
‘Rather than relying on private social networks, the welfare state’s citizens rely on the state’s 
responsibility to guarantee social benefits in times of need’ (Gundelachet et al. 2010, 631). Such 
situation contributes to social decline because people over time lose the initiative to get involved 
in social interaction on a daily basis, which induces a passive civil society (see Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2002; Gundelach et al. 2010; Cox and Jimenez 1992).  
Contrary to this, scholars who support the ‘crowding in’ hypothesis argue that the state and 
informal safety nets complement each other, stressing that a more generous welfare state can 
4 
 
contribute to better informal distribution of help to those in need (Morduch 1999). The cohesive 
principle that intertwines the state and informal safety nets facilitates the production of social 
capital and improves the infrastructure of civil society and the very institutions (Rothstein 2001; 
Torpe 2003).   
There are many interesting pieces of evidence to support both approaches.4 However, Lucas 
and Stark (1985) were among the scholars who paved the way for an alternative approach, which 
offers a more balanced perception of the relation between state and informal welfare systems. 
Their argument rests on a belief that a combination of self-interest and altruism is crucial for the 
functioning of informal safety nets. On the one hand, self-interest is a necessary precondition for 
individuals to enter into different family or community risk-sharing arrangements (such as lending 
and borrowing, remittances or other private transfers), while on the other hand, altruism creates an 
ambience of mutual trust that is necessary for maintaining these arrangements. In addition to this, 
Becker (1974) underlines the importance of social norms and pressures when it comes to good 
reputation, distinctiveness, being on good terms with neighbours or cousins, benevolence and so 
on. These factors significantly influence informal welfare and should not be overlooked in 
theoretical analyses.  
Based on this eclectic collection of motives for informal social support, an alternative 
approach suggests that complete crowding out of informal welfare is unlikely, because social 
pressures, norms, self-interest and altruism participate in its maintenance, regardless of the size of 
the welfare state. One of the implications of this approach is that altruism alone is not sufficient, 
and if private transfers (and informal welfare in general) are based only on altruism and not on 
self-interest or social norms and pressures, then the complete crowding out of private transfers by 
public ones is likely to occur (Cox and Jimenez 1992, 158).  
Yet, many scholars point to imperfections of informal welfare due to which it declines in front 
of the state social assistance programs. Informal welfare is particularly fragile when:  - a series of misfortunes accumulate;  - catastrophe affects a broader region and more communities;  - the consequences of an event are irreversible or lasting;  - individuals or families lack human and social capital;  - the costs of risks are very high and unpredictable (Heemskerk et al. 2004, 947).  
There are numerous other reasons, such as human factors, which may break down or devitalize 
different informal welfare mechanisms, particularly risk-sharing. Problems of moral hazard, 
asymmetric information, and enforcement of mutual reciprocal agreements seem to be prevailing 
factors that hinder the effective functioning of informal safety nets. Likewise, reciprocal relations 
very often may convert into patron-client relations, and “the terms of reciprocal exchange may 
greatly favor the rich, although the terms are to everyone`s absolute advantage” (Morduch 1999, 
195). In other words, as social ties are weaker, informal welfare is more subjected to decline or to 
its replacement by the welfare state, and vice versa.  
Lastly, we should also acknowledge here that the revitalization, maintenance or emergence of 
new informal welfare and supportive networks may appear as a result of a weak and dysfunctional 
state. For instance, a great body of literature on post-socialism points exactly to the proliferation 
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of informal safety nets due to ideological and institutional reorganizations in transitional societies 
where people become increasingly exposed to uncertainties and risks. In cases when “the state 
withdraws from the provision of protection from social risks that citizens expect or need, a bottom-
up process of welfare provision and financing replaces formal welfare provision, citizens 
‘creating’ an informal system of welfare that is independent from the state, but which fulfils the 
functions that the state should perform” (Polese et al. 2014, 186). Such informal welfare and safety 
mechanisms do not necessarily follow traditional forms but rather emerge as a transitional, sui 
generis phenomenon (Polese et al. 2014).  
Considering the complexity of each presented approach, the evidence from my fieldwork 
rather suggests that the first approach, i.e. the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, offers the greatest 
explanatory potential, given that radical transformation of the understanding of practice of 
gleaning has occurred exactly due to the growing welfare state. Therefore, in the last section of the 
paper my argumentation will follow the line of this hypothesis. But prior to this, I will analyze 
institutions of private property and the welfare state diachronically, in order to explain and 
demonstrate how their change influenced the practice of gleaning.  
 
Diachronic Perspectives of Institutional Change: Private Property and the Welfare State  
Private Property    
When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (the KSCS) was established in 1918, 
Vojvodina province, which became part of the Kingdom in 1918, faced significant discrepancies 
in terms of property. While private property up to 10 ha (82.2%) dominated in Serbia in 1918, at 
about the same time big estates over 100 ha dominated over 50% of the total territory in Vojvodina 
province (Šećerov 1929). Likewise, while only 11% of people were landless in Serbia, this number 
in Vojvodina province was significantly higher and represented 38.8% of the overall population. 
Such circumstances created the rationale for the first agrarian reform (1919-1941). One of the 
crucial aims of the reform was more equal distribution of land to those persons and families who 
did not have enough land or did not have it at all, in order to avoid structural discrepancies in 
agricultural development and the ownership structure between Serbia and new member states of 
the Kingdom. Agrarian beneficiaries in Vojvodina province, for instance, were given ca. 5.8 ha of 
land, and the planners of the reform foresaw that agrarian beneficiaries should redeem the received 
land and become its official owners upon completion of the reform. Due to successive financial 
crises in the KSCS, the world economic crisis in 1925, which had a massive impact on agriculture, 
and the threat of the Second World War, many agricultural beneficiaries could not redeem their 
land and hence become its official owners.5  
Within the newly formed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1946-1992), the second 
agrarian reform, conducted immediately after the Second World War, was resting on the principles 
which saw in private property the biggest threat to socialist society. The Communist party 
perceived the sole institution of private property as the main “preserver of the bourgeois system 
and capitalistic class relations” that the new revolutionary system should abolish. Henceforth, the 
targets of the new reform were all big estates, as well as private property above 10 ha, that had 
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been expropriated from the owners without any compensation whatsoever. The reform was aimed 
at the etatization of all resources and control over means of production. The new politics 
encouraged indirect subsidies to state farms, the limitation of peasant holdings and the imposition 
of high taxes on private farming (Halpern 1963). Since the existing agrarian maximum of 10 ha 
applied both to families and individuals, this encouraged massive property divisions among 
families or within extended households (zadruga) which survived in some parts of Serbia even 
after the Second World War (Kaser 2002). While the socialist agrarian reform furthered the 
vanishing of traditional forms of private property that were kept in zadruga and other similar types 
of extended families on the one hand, the reform did not reach its planned goal, i.e. the formation 
of an industrial instead of agrarian society and state agriculture, on the other hand. On the contrary, 
there were numerous examples of how people managed to preserve and save their landed property 
by reaching for diverse and creative informal strategies.  
The adoption of the 1991 Republic Law marked the end of the existing socialist regulation in 
agriculture, and enforced restitution of agricultural land, taken from previous owners successively 
in 1946 and in 1953. More importantly, from 1991 onwards, private property has regained its 
symbolic (modern) meaning as a free possession, with the free will of the owner to manage his 
estate in accordance to his preferences. According to the 2012 census, 78.4 % of land in Vojvodina 
province is in private ownership, whereas in different parts of Serbia, depending on local 
conditions, the land ownership structure ranges from 41.3% to 73.8%. Landless people make up 
0.13%, while the rest is in state or other types of ownership (Popis poljoprivrede 2012).  
It can be said that two social-economic processes crystallized and went along with different 
ideological and institutional reconfigurations in twentieth-century Serbia. The first was the 
continuous growth and development of agriculture at the expense of traditional modes of 
production. The second was sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger fortification of private 
property at the expense of traditional and collective property relations (Pavković 2014, 284-296). 
 
The Welfare State 
The preconditions for state welfare politics emerged in Serbia during the 1920s. Before this period, 
social politics was mostly based on voluntary and spontaneous organization of interested parties 
such as ‘Cash of mutual assistance’, agricultural credit cooperatives, agricultural supply 
cooperatives, health cooperatives etc, which should be seen as the pioneers of modern workers and 
agricultural social politics (Kostić 1929; Isić 1995). The KSCS gained the first common law on 
social politics in 1922. The law was based on principles of general obligation, universality and 
mutuality (Čalić 2004, 217). This law had many weakness, but the most notorious ones were the 
exemption of some professional groups from the law (craftsmen, agricultural producers and 
attendants), and the temporary suspension of unemployment insurance. In 1938, the law was 
revised and new categories such as entrepreneurs and craftsmen were included in the system of 
social insurance. This also referred to disabled and mentally disordered persons and the elderly. 
Although the revised law encompassed broader categories of people, the KSCS in the late 1930s 
was at the very bottom of the European average, with only 20% of the overall population being 
insured, while the Czech Republic at that time, for instance, had around 50% insurees. The KSCS 
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was also among the European countries with the lowest expenditures for social security, with only 
0.6% of GDP (Čalić 2004, 403-408).   
There are many different explanations for why social politics in Serbia and the KSCS in 
general started to develop relatively late and impartially. Although problems of lack of social 
insurance existed in South European countries as well, Čalić (2004) argues that they were not as 
severe and obvious as in other Western European societies. She suggests that we might find the 
reasons for this in the structure of the family and in marriage customs that implied living in an 
extended family or household (zadruge), and also taking care of old and ill members of the family. 
Besides, in Serbian tradition, the church and the community played an important role in providing 
social care, while the state was not seen as a primary social protector. But maybe the predominant 
reason is to be found in the economy of the KSCS, which was based mostly on small and medium 
enterprises, where concentration of industrial workforce could not occur. The majority of workers 
had worked only periodically in factories, while maintaining their main occupation, which was 
agriculture (220). In the late 1930s the worker structures started to grow, change and 
professionalize, as did their understanding of social politics.  
Building the welfare state was one of the goals of the newly established Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The state took over the majority of activities related to social services, 
increasing social care and provisions. As the socialist state saw in patriarchal culture the main 
enemy of modernization, the dismantling of old patriarchal and traditional ties was strongly 
encouraged through a range of processes, such as increasing employment of women, establishing 
day-care for children, providing maternity leave and benefits, urban migration etc. The appearance 
of new social risks, marginalized groups and social exclusion were, apart from other factors, 
consequences of dismantled traditional family relations and informal safety nets. Among new 
vulnerable groups appeared old people, the handicapped, mentally disordered persons, children 
and juvenile delinquents, so the state had to develop a whole network of different services that 
would meet their needs, such as day care, health, educational and therapeutic centres and so on.  
Until the collapse of Yugoslav socialism in 1991 the state undertook the role of main welfare 
provider by developing its channels through which national resources were further distributed. 
State branches and centres for social work were organized in the 1960s in order to recognize, 
analyze and better treat local problems and needs. Around the same time period, centres for social 
work started to be financed by local municipalities, and state enterprises took over some segments 
of social policies in the late 1970s, fostered by the ideology of Yugoslav self-management 
socialism (Šućur 2003). In this way, domains of work and production took over social function, 
which should be the responsibility of the state in all democratic countries (9). The growing and 
overprotecting Yugoslav social politics, however, could not meet the set goals and needs of 
insurees due to the frequent financial crises. To name a few, the state was faced with a massive 
increase in the number of pensioners, due to which agricultural producers were included in the 
compulsory pension insurance scheme only in the mid-1980s. The socialist economy was under 
pressure from the growing workforce as a result of rural-to-urban migration. Instead of caring for 
employees in socialist companies and the public sector, the social policy was directed towards 
unemployment, which became the burning issue (Grandits 2012).  
The collapse of socialism on former Yugoslavian territory did not bring about significantly 
new developments in terms of the welfare state, as many theoreticians of post-socialism had 
8 
 
predicted. The great body of post-socialist literature, apart from emphasizing that countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe cannot be perceived as a homogeneous region with regard to the 
welfare state, points to the fact that they share certain commonalities either in withdrawal of the 
state, structural mutations or in the lack of a social state due to embracing the neoliberal paradigm 
(Szikra and Tomka 2009; Cook 2007; Polese et al. 2014; Deacon 2000). My evidence, however, 
runs counter to this dominant argumentation. When Yugoslavia broke apart, all former member 
states preserved the existing concept of the welfare state. The main differences, though, concern 
institutional decentralization, professionalization and diversification, along with higher presence 
of the NGO sector, foreign and domestic donors, and community-based services. In Serbia, for 
instance, the main financier of social services remains the state or the local government, with over 
55%, while NGOs make up 23% of the overall share in the provision of social services. Since 
2008, the total number of social services financed by the local government has increased as well. 
The same is true for social beneficiaries. “Since 2000, the number of recipients of insurance based 
benefits has almost doubled, regardless of the legal changes making effectuation of the rights 
stricter” (Vuković and Perišić 2011, 241). Likewise, the last few years register a positive trend of 
NGOs that are financed by the state, particularly in domains of social protection of youth, Roma, 
gender equality, and similar issues in the field of social exclusion (Vuković 2013, 67-72).  
I would like briefly to demonstrate the impact of the growth of the welfare state in Serbia. 
Expenditures for social security were 24.6% of GDP in 2010, which is an impressive increase if 
we take into consideration that they were only 0.6% of GDP in the 1930s.6 Expansion of the 
welfare state certainly left some consequences, which are visible in the very low participation of 
citizens in humanitarian (1.2%,), religious (3.9%) or environmental (1.1%) initiatives. This may 
be an indicator of the underdeveloped civil sector in Serbia (Vuković 2013, 68). Moreover, this 
evidence strongly contributes to the hypothesis of crowding out of civic interests and the informal 
organizing of people by the welfare state. In what follows, I will try to demonstrate and analyze 
how the expansion of the welfare state, but also the strengthening of private property, affected 
social actors and their understanding of the practice of gleaning. 
 
Blurred Lines of Gleaning – the Case of Gaj  
The village of Gaj is located in the South Banat District in Kovin municipality, within the 
Vojvodina province. Gaj lies on a flat and fertile terrain with the Danube River flowing along the 
southern edge of the village over a length of 7 km. With a population of almost 3000, this village 
is among the most populated ones in the area. The village community is highly multicultural and 
relatively harmonious, with Serbs as the majority and Czechs, Romanians, Hungarians and Roma 
as minorities.  
During the socialist period, a part of the village population was employed in state companies, 
industries or in the public sector in nearby cities. A large number of these companies are now 
closed or are becoming insolvent, leading to many people losing their jobs. There are two relatively 
successful companies in the village. One is a coal mining company and the other is a privatised 
agricultural enterprise.  
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The local population, both unemployed and employed in state or private companies, cultivate 
land, while livestock breeding is in constant decline. The average area of cultivated land per 
household ranges between 5 ha and 20 ha. This usually depends on several factors, such as the 
number of people living in a household, age structure, or additional professional occupations of 
the family members. According to many informants, at present some twenty people from the 
village stand out from the others in that they cultivate more than 100 ha. On the other hand, mainly 
professionals such as doctors, veterinarians, lawyers, professors, teachers, and a large percentage 
of Roma belong to a tiny group of people without any land (or possessing only small amounts). 
From the perspective of state social politics, the most vulnerable categories in Serbian villages, 
including Gaj, are old people and Roma: the former due to very low pensions (if they are pension 
beneficiaries) and frequent neglect by family, health and social institutions, and the latter because 
they are mostly unemployed, uneducated and landless.  
Apart from being relatively prosperous, the village of Gaj faces the typical problems of rural 
Serbia, such as a high mortality rate, unemployment, aging and outflow of youth, negative 
population growth and an increasing number of single persons. However, the majority of 
informants stress one problem in particular. That is the increased number of field thefts since 2000. 
Investigation of the reasons behind field thefts initially has led me to unexpected and uncommon 
local understandings of the practice of gleaning from both agricultural producers on one side, and 
Roma, who are signified as the main field trespassers in the village, on the other side.  
 
The Practice of Gleaning  
There is a universal logic adapted to the physical fact that we are surrounded by limited space. 
Such logic developed various patterns of entitlements to use land that became intrinsic to every 
social organization (Ellickson 1993). Every region, be it agricultural or mountainous, has 
developed its customary rules related to use and access to agricultural fields and other natural 
resources, collective property rights and reciprocal relationships. Property, as a concept and an 
analytical tool, is one of the most important concerns of legal anthropology (F. Benda-Beckmann, 
K. Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006). The pioneers of legal pluralism, Franz and Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann, defined property as “a bundle of rights and relationship between persons forged 
around valuable goods material and immaterial” (F. and K. Benda-Beckmann 2014, 20).  
‘Such bundles comprise four major elements: (1) construction of property objects from material and 
immaterial parts of the social and physical environment; (2) definition of social units that can be the bearers 
of property rights and obligations; (3) relationships bound in the framework of rights and obligations; and 
(4) spatio-temporal dimension’ (F. and K. Benda-Beckmann 2014, 21).  
The second and third elements of this definition will be of special concern for this section: 
that is, social units that can be the bearers of property rights and obligations; and relationships that 
emerged within the framework of rights and obligations.  
Diachronic analyses of developments of customary law, which concern the domain of land 
rights in particular, are important for understanding today’s practices, which rely on custom and 
its acknowledgement by official, state, law and vice versa, but also for understanding the 
complexity of legal plurality in certain settings (F. Benda-Beckmann and K. Benda-Beckmann 
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2006). The institute of gleaning most likely emerged as an obligation that landowners held towards 
their social environment. The right to glean was thus regulated by customary law that served as a 
mechanism for acquiring social equilibrium when dearth, poverty and landlessness were socially 
widespread. Probably for the same reason, almost every agricultural society had known practices 
that were based on the same or similar patterns. The institution of gleaning should be understood 
as one of many existing facets of collective property. Pavković (2014) also argues that collective 
rights over private property exist almost everywhere.  
‘When the harvest is reaped on an arable land, it temporally becomes common. Everyone has the right to 
bring cattle to graze on it, or to glean it, i.e. to collect grains of wheat, clips of corn, or grapes in a harvested 
vineyard. From this originated the old proverb: To find oneself in a non-harvested vineyard (“Naći se u 
neobranom grožđu” J. D.), i.e. in legally or morally impermissible act or situation. The message is clear: 
you can glean in a harvested vineyard, but should not find yourself in a non-harvested one!’ (Pavković 
2014, 287).  
One important remark should be made here, though. Collective property, generally common 
in many parts of the world, was primarily related to pasture breeding in south-Slavic countries and 
south-eastern Europe, while on the other side, arable lands were exclusively in private or family 
ownership (Pavković 2014, 284-296). While in the first case collective property entitlements 
automatically evolve from common territorial, kinship or tribal belonging, in the latter case the 
notion of consent is necessary in order to authorise gleaner’s rights. The consent may be explicitly 
gained from the landowner, or it can be implicitly, culturally and customarily, communicated and 
accepted. The temporary right to glean on private land therefore classifies this right in the sphere 
of collective property rights. This in-betweenness of the practice of gleaning, as will be shown 
later, makes the very right suitable for different interpretations.  
The next aspect is also very important for the practice of gleaning. Although on the surface it 
may seem that the practice of gleaning was pure charity, in the sense that an altruistic landowner 
does not expect anything in return from gleaners, I rather maintain that the practice itself has 
always been based on reciprocal relationships and utility. We have to consider social variables 
such as distinction, a good name or benevolence as important components of reciprocity, and as 
integral elements of any given social interaction. The famous utilitarian philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham ([1781] 2000) calls these social variables pleasures.  
‘The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be 
possessed by the beings who may be the object of benevolence’ (X, 37). 
‘The pleasures of a good name are the pleasures that accompany the persuasion of a man`s being in the 
acquisition or the possession of the good-will of the world about him; that is, of such members of society 
as he is likely to have concerns with; and as a means of it, either their love or their esteem, or both: and as 
a fruit of it, of his being in the way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services. These 
may likewise be called the pleasure of good repute, the pleasure of honour, or the pleasures of the moral 
sanction’ (VII, 36).  
Benevolent and charitable actions are not therefore motivated merely by material but also by 
symbolic drivers, particularly in traditional communities. Benevolence and charity at least may be 
extorted. Even if they are seemingly voluntary, they may be often necessary and sometimes forced 
(Pavković 2014, 334-340). In the everyday life of the community, all social interaction is based 
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on well-recognized norms of exchange and reciprocity (Foster 1973, 105). The landowner’s 
generosity towards many landless people for whom gleaning was sometimes the only way to 
survive had at least three facets. The first was social-symbolical, the second was political-
instrumental, and the third was economic. The first was aimed at building the landowner’s 
reputation in the community (his good name, in Bentham’s understanding), extending and 
strengthening his social network, which evolved by doing favours for his subordinates or taking 
them into his protection. In this way, the landowner engaged in establishing his clientalistic 
network among his subordinates, who would repay him later for his generosity by supporting him 
in his political ambitions. The second facet of the landowner’s generosity was consequently 
political-instrumental. By allowing the poor to glean his field, the landowner met their existential 
needs in the short run, but in the long run he prevented prospective social unrest on his own 
property, and acquired for himself stable political support among local population. Finally, it 
should not be forgotten that landowners’ generosity probably also had a purely economic aspect. 
Landowners’ opportunity costs were minimal or negligible. The immediate cost of an alternative, 
such as not letting gleaners into his field, would have caused more troubles and unrest. In other 
words, after the field has been harvested, the landowner would not suffer any economic losses by 
letting gleaners into his field, while his social and political gain would be much higher in the long 
run.7  
 
The New Understanding of the Practice of Gleaning  
Subsequent developments in agriculture and in the welfare state have had a decisive impact on the 
changed perception of gleaning. In socialist Yugoslavia, the category of landless people officially 
disappeared, due to the inauguration of three different types of ownership: collective, state and 
private. Besides, the state took over the role of the welfare patron. After the collapse of socialism, 
the liberal-democratic transition gave private owners the right to enlarge their property without 
any restrictions whatsoever, while the state has remained the main provider of welfare. Private 
property and the welfare state have evidently been developed over the years at the expense of the 
practice of gleaning. In previous times, gleaning evoked connotations of social, economic and 
political reciprocity. Today, in the context of rural Serbia, it often represents a euphemism for field 
theft.8 Pauperization and decreased living standards, which are consequences not only of civil war 
in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) but also of failed transitional economic and political reforms in 
Serbia after 2000, have amplified the rate of criminality in the cities and in villages respectively. 
The majority of people in the village of Gaj relate the rise of criminality to Roma. Recent 
population surveys and research show that Roma are among the most vulnerable and marginalized 
population in Serbia. Their deprivation is intergenerational and creates a continuous poverty trap 
(Bodewig and Sethi 2005). For this and similar reasons, such as massive unemployment, high 
poverty and low hygiene standards, as well as the traditional stigma of being ‘thieves’ and 
unreliable persons, Roma represent a socially marginalized group in the village of Gaj.  
People often suggestively commented in my presence on how is it possible that they have ‘full 
barns of corn, when they have neither land nor machines’, or ironically asked themselves, ‘Where 
were Roma working late hours when their horse carriages are full of corn?’ Sometimes, when they 
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spotted Roma cruising on their carriages toward fields in the late afternoons, they would tease each 
other about whose plot would be ‘gleaned’ next. In the long summer nights while my neighbours 
and I were having sabor,9 I heard many stories how some nearby villages had resolved the problem 
of field thefts. Villagers would join and share costs of hiring private security company with rangers 
who were surveilling their fields, and were equipped with fast terrain jeeps and cameras. This 
allegedly gave positive results because many Roma from these villages sold their horses and 
carriages.  
Obviously this was not the case in Gaj village, and many people expressed their bitterness 
towards authorities in Kovin municipality because of their incapability to protect peasants’ 
property. 
‘People are revolted because of the field thefts. Roma steal. I was robbed of 1 ha of corn. They have now 
started to steal sunflowers, which was not the case before. They even steal clover. Everyone knows who 
steals but peasants cannot do anything. For this reason they themselves protect their own fields. They wake 
up at 2-3 am, take their guns and surveil their fields’ (P. K. 20. 06. 2013.).  
Even though Kovin municipality has recently hired two field watchers, who initially patrolled 
on bicycles and subsequently on motorbikes, this was not enough to watch over and protect the 
whole village territory, which spreads over a dozen kilometres.  
‘Field watchers don’t have great authority: that’s an issue. They must not use force. They have rather the 
function of tallyman. If field theft or damage occurs, they take a picture, ascertain the theft, and forward 
the report to the authorities that are supposed to initiate investigation. (…) Despite the field watchers, I 
was robbed of half a chain of corn.10 Now I should take the report and sue the municipality because I was 
robbed. The municipality bears the costs of field watchers, not the village’ (S. S. 08. 04. 2013.).  
On the other hand, a field watcher emphasized the structural problem of the field thefts in the 
village:  
‘The fear protects the field, not the field watcher. We have a contract from the first of April till November. 
We do nothing during winter, because we are not authorized. The problem is that our authority that we 
built during summer declines over winter’ (M. P. 19.07.2013).  
Thieves are, according to the field watcher, rarely brought to justice or made to take 
responsibility for their acts, whether due to political tolerance on the local and republic level or 
their financial insolvency. The local policeman greatly supports the field watcher’s opinion and 
adds that this may be due to the fact that field thefts are hardly provable and are generally 
considered to be of low value. One of the main problems, according to him, is that the police can 
only initiate an investigation: once the prosecutor takes over the case, the damaged party has to 
sue the thief on the basis of a private lawsuit. ‘This almost never happens because the game is not 
worth the candle (Skuplja dara nego mera). So, the damaged person is never reimbursed, while 
on the other hand the prisons are full and field thieves never end up in prison’ (D. S. 18. 07. 2015.).  
State social politics are partially to blame for increased field thefts. In the interview with the 
social worker form Kovin municipality I learned that state social politics over the years have 
moved towards insuring unemployed people who are capable of working, which was not the case 
only ten to fifteen years ago. Roma capable of working almost automatically become social 
beneficiaries on different bases (being unemployed, single mother or father, illness, child benefits 
13 
 
etc.), but those who have no children or have only one child do not receive unemployment benefits 
over the whole year. They are entitled to unemployment benefits for the first six winter months, 
after which these benefits are temporarily suspended during the three summer months because it 
is believed that beneficiaries can find seasonal work, or can be hired as wage labourers during the 
harvest. After the summer they re-enter the social protection system for the rest of the year. There 
are also certain limitations regarding child benefits. Roma and other social beneficiaries are 
entitled to receive child benefit allowance for up to four children until they reach the age of 18 (for 
the first four children born), despite the actual number of children. In reality Roma usually have 
more than four children. Probably due to these restrictions, Roma try to overcome their financial 
difficulties by applying different strategies.  
From the perspective of a social worker from Kovin municipality, in spite of these existing 
limitations of social provisions, new social politics towards Roma do not encourage them to work; 
nor do they create a supportive work environment. 
‘Together with unemployment benefits and subsided prices for communal services and electricity, plus 
child benefit, maternity benefit, parental benefit etc., they have enough regular income for living. If they 
need something in addition to this, then they find a way, they will work for a while. Some do not even need 
to work. They are absolutely demotivated to work’ (Social worker, 1. 08. 2014).  
The perspective of a local shopkeeper from the Roma quarter in Gaj village is unsurprisingly 
different. The shopkeeper’s assessment of the real standard of living of the Roma on the basis of 
their daily consumption and regular encounters with them suggests that they live the worst during 
winter because they do not have many opportunities to diversify their income and hence rely only 
on social benefits, while during the summer months the situation is somewhat different.  
‘Roma make up approximately 15 per cent of Gaj’s population. They cope somehow. They collect steel, 
iron, aluminium, receive social benefits. I see that according to their daily incomes. But during winter it is 
harder: they cannot work and there is no job on the horizon’ (T. M. 12. 07. 2013.).  
The shopkeeper’s opinion supports the personal testimony of one of my Roma informants 
who applies gleaning as a strategy for diversifying income and overcoming shortcomings in the 
family budget: ‘We receive only two child benefits. We hardly cope. We do not eat three times a 
day… but then, well, then with the summer comes corn …’ (I. Ž. 18. 07. 2013.). The fact that 
gleaning is broadly practised among the Roma as a summer strategy to overcome financial 
difficulties is confirmed by a school teacher, who expressed very emotionally in an interview how 
Roma parents come to ask his permission to let their children off school for a couple of days in 
order to help them in gleaning. Another Roma informant admitted that in previous years his family 
would glean from four to five tons of corn and would sell it for ‘nice money’. This money served 
them as a saving for the winter, or for firewood.  
However, there is considerable common understanding among the people of Gaj village that 
the deep poverty and existential needs of the Roma are to be the responsibility of the centre for 
social work, which takes care of vulnerable groups at the local level. Such understanding was best 
summarized in the interview with the president of the association of pensioners from Gaj village. 
Referring to the functioning of the association’s safety network, the president said: ‘We do not 
help Roma, although we have Roma members whom we treat equally. Other Roma (non-members 
- J. D.) who ask for money or food from us, we direct to the Red Cross or to the Centre for Social 
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Work’ (N. I. 03. 07. 2013.). As described in the previous pages, due to the growing welfare state 
over the years, Roma were crowded out from local and informal welfare networks and became an 
official social category subjected to different state social programs and provisions. But 
interestingly, existing restrictions in unemployment and child benefits unexpectedly bring to the 
fore the importance of local informal welfare, i.e. gleaning. Roma realize that this gap as well as 
shortcomings in formal care give them a rationale for activating old customary patterns in order to 
overcome their financial difficulties.  
The practice of gleaning, as indicated above, nowadays rarely invokes sympathy among 
villagers because, apart from being identified with theft, it is also related to serious violence and 
improper conducting of justice by authorities, which provokes anger. 
‘Thefts are everywhere. We cannot stop the thieves. They enter into fields freely, and even if someone sees 
them they don’t pay attention to it at all. Although we have field watchers there is no difference. Five or 
six years ago one field watcher almost got into serious trouble for shooting the thief. The whole village 
signed the petition to save him, while thief passed without any consequences’ (Lj. R. 11. 07. 2013.).  
Besides, field thieves sometimes cause serious field damage. There have been a few cases 
when field thieves burned corn stubble in order to bring them to the ground and then simply picked 
clips of corn. This gleaning technique has caused several fires, but since the culprits were not 
prosecuted, the landowner himself had to pay for the damage. One of my informants reckons that 
Roma usually glean in a safer way, due to which evidence of field theft is not immediately visible. 
Two or three men glean a harvested field, while another group steals corn in the middle of a 
neighbouring non-harvested field. The visible group acts as cover for those who are invisible in 
the neighbouring field either to random passers-by or to field watchers. Gleaning as a practise 
certainly cannot be constrained only to theft, but thieves have contributed a lot to the changed 
perception of the practice among villagers and landowners.  
 ‘Those who have stolen have made us a problem. Because of them we are forbidden now to 
glean. Many didn’t want to work hard and to collect corn from the ground, because it was easier 
for them to pick corn from stubble. I understand landowners: they have invested a lot in land and 
maybe have had either drought or flooding, and as a culmination someone has stolen their corn. 
They’ve had enough’ (S. R. 17. 07. 2015.).11  
Large numbers of people consider gleaning nowadays as a subversive practice, which partly 
explains why it is believed that little remains of the old practice of gleaning. Likewise, the term 
‘gleaning’ is used by some Roma as a euphemism for theft. The new understanding of the practice 
of gleaning is devoid of its main impulse – reciprocity. In a strict sense, the name of the practice 
is kept, but the nature of the practice itself and its symbolism have changed radically. It has 
converted into a one-sided practice that no longer has any social purpose apart from satisfying the 
short-term existential needs of the gleaners.  
One crucial aspect of the practice of gleaning in the past was explicit or implicit consent. 
According to one of my Roma informants, gleaners in Gaj village usually did not ask for explicit 
consent from the landowner, relying instead on implicit, customary and socially acceptable norms 
of old practice. Likewise, the customary in-betweenness of the right to glean – that is, the 
temporary collective right over private property – gives gleaners a certain legitimacy to claim their 
rights today. They apply a traditional understanding of gleaning and the rights associated with it 
15 
 
in order to restore the status quo ante (see Scott 1976, 157-192). On the other hand, those who 
steal use a traditional understanding of the practice, thus evading social criticism, potential 
sanctions, and involvement in the theft. Such strategy minimizes the social burden of theft. One of 
my Roma informants rationalizes field thefts in the following way:  
‘There are many Roma who steal, but there are also those who don’t. We are among the latter. Many hardly 
live and they do not have other options but to steal. One cannot live from social benefits, particularly not 
during winter when we have to pay for electricity and firewood. With 13000 RSD (approximately 107 
EUR – J.D.) that we get in the name of social benefits we have to pay either for the firewood or for the pig 
for the winter. We have to find 20000 RSD (approximately 165 EUR – J.D.) for this. We don`t have that 
money. The situation is somewhat better in the summer months (S. R. 17. 07. 2015.).  
This brings us to consideration of an important aspect that lies beneath the practice of gleaning 
which is usually forgotten in daily life, but gives strong credo to today’s gleaners. Invoking the 
old practice of gleaning has to do with a subsistence ethic that was present particularly in 
traditional communities. As Scott argues, ‘the fear of food shortages has, in most pre-capitalist 
peasant societies, given rise to what might appropriately be termed a “subsistence ethic”’ (Scott 
1976, 2). The universality of this ethic emerged as a result of the centuries-old experience of living 
close to the margin, facing threats of famine and diverse natural catastrophes, which consequently 
have developed a special ethical universe where existing social relations primarily have the 
purpose of insuring the poor. Many social arrangements, therefore, such as patterns of reciprocity, 
forced generosity, communal land, and work-sharing, aim to even out existing differences in a 
family`s resources which might otherwise have thrown them below subsistence (Scott 1976, 3). 
Economic relations that are based on a special notion of what is just and unjust, as well as of rights 
that have emerged within a subsistence ethic, are among what scholars have called the moral 
economy, a term that was firstly inaugurated by E. P. Thompson. According to Scott, the moral 
economy represented the normative roots of peasant politics and society worldwide. Underneath 
this normative order is the safety-first principle, which manages crucial economic, social and moral 
relations in the peasant community (Scott 1976, 1-12). The safety-first principle is based on the 
idea of redistribution of all available resources within the village or community, whether 
communal or private, in order to meet the elementary and subsistence needs of members in need.  
It seems that embedding the practice of gleaning in an old normative order of peasant society 
today legitimizes certain expectations among the Roma. As they mostly belong to a group of the 
poorest in the village, their hopes rely on old sympathies and understanding related to gleaning, 
i.e. the right to subsistence that this practice used to provide. They try to maintain continuity with 
the old practice, which represented a legitimate and socially acceptable act in the past, regardless 
of what kind of actual activity is going on in the name of gleaning. Even though the context has 
changed – the welfare state and private property have evolved as new bearers of social security – 
Roma, through the survival of the old understanding of gleaning, maintain connections with the 
informal welfare from which they have been largely crowded out.  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Conclusion  
Within customary law, the institute of gleaning served in the past as a form of informal welfare, 
based not only on charity but also on mutual supportive mechanisms for both actors involved: 
landowners and the poor. This paper shows how such an ancient institute of customary law 
survived the era of socialism and mutated in the transitional, post-socialist setting when people 
were enabled to freely expand their private property, strengthening their sense of ownership. Due 
to the growing welfare state, which undermines local ways of informal safety networks and 
organization and contributes to transferring responsibility for local wellbeing to the upper state 
level, but also due to the growing number of private property owners, frequent field thefts have 
brought about a changed perception of gleaning among people in Gaj village. Indeed, on the other 
side, those who glean are potential culprits under constant suspicion. Conditionally speaking, this 
custom can be considered as an “empty custom” because its intrinsic components, commonly 
shared meanings, rules and obligations, are not evenly communicated between actors, which is 
one of the necessary preconditions for its proper functioning. Finally, the question is, can we still 
talk about traditional gleaning?  
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Notes 
1. This paper is a result of broader doctoral work that investigates everyday strategies in rural Serbia in the post-
socialist period, with special emphasis on agricultural, economic and institutional changes. The village of Gaj is 
the epicentre of my observation where I conducted extensive field research in 2013, one month in 2014 and in 
2015. The findings presented in this paper are a very partial reflection of overall data that I gathered through 
participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews with over eighty informants.  
2. This may also refer to the renewed emphasis on tradition. According to Turner (2015), this is not an indicator of 
state failure or of reactionary rejection of globalization. Rather, the dynamic capacities of tradition allow different 
actors, on the global and local scale, to “invoke tradition as a strategic tool in legal repertoires to further their 
respective interests, ranging from development goals such as sustainability, nature conservation and good 
governance to absolute hegemony in the religious field” (387).  
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3. Many economists rightly point out that it is very hard to estimate and evaluate the real purpose of informal 
transfers and distributions among community members or family. Some of them need not be the result of risk-
sharing, or are not necessarily aimed at improving a person’s or a community’s wellbeing. Alderman and Paxson 
(1992, 71) suggest that simply documenting that transfer exists between donor and recipient does not imply risk-
sharing. For instance, migrants may send remittances to increase their chances of inheriting family assets, or to 
pay families back for the costs of their education (71). On the other hand, some transfers may also be driven by 
purely altruistic reasons, when donors do not expect anything in return. In such cases they may be treated as gifts 
by both parties: donor and recipient.  
4. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) show, for example, how increased generosity of state benefits makes defecting 
from the informal family risk-sharing contracts more attractive, and likewise affects the increment of the 
unemployment rate. In a similar fashion, Cox and Jimenez (1992) indicate that the amount of private transfers 
from young to old would have been almost 20 percent larger in Peruvian families without different social security 
programs. On the other hand, a very interesting study by Gundelach et al. (2010) on the impact of the size of the 
welfare state on informal volunteering in Swiss cantons does not find any critical impact of welfare state 
arrangements on informal volunteering. Instead they argue that socio-cultural conditions are more important 
determinants of informal volunteering than the welfare state. In their ethnographic study on rural Latin America, 
based on interviews with welfare recipients, Heemskerk et al. (2004) conclude that access to state transfers does 
not replace informal insurance systems, particularly in reference to food sharing, reciprocal labor, or religious 
ceremonies. State social benefits increase the amount of transfers in existing exchange networks, and 
consequently contribute to better functioning of reciprocity when there is more to share (951).   
5. The first agrarian reform, although impartial and inconsistent in some segments (see Lekić 2002, 117-139), 
should be seen as institutionalization of private property and the beginning of capitalist relationships in 
agriculture. Nevertheless, tendencies of individualization of private property, as well as gaining its institutional 
sovereignty in relation to family, social and political organization, were severely disrupted in the era of socialism. 
6. http://www.novimagazin.rs/ekonomija/srbija-za-socijalnu-zastitu-izdvaja-manji-deo-bdp-od-eu (Accessed May 
24, 2015).  
7. I owe this insightful remark to my supervisor, Professor Peter Finke, from the Department of Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, University of Zurich.  
8. Three recent newspaper articles have discussed the problem of the relationship between gleaning and field thefts, 
showing that field thefts are not only a problem in Vojvodina province but also in other agricultural regions in 
Serbia. The first two articles reflected on the practice underneath the gleaning, i.e. field theft. The third article 
offered a more philosophical argument that gleaning negates the sanctity and absoluteness of private property 
rights. Nevertheless, what all three articles have in common is that they understand gleaning as subversive 
practice. See: http://www.pressonline.rs/svet/balkan/182860/pabircenje-ili-kradja-kukuruza.html (Accessed 
October 24, 2011). http://juznobanatskevesti.rs/info-servis/item/365-za-pabircenje-je-potrebna-dozvola-ili-vas-
ceka-kazna#.VWOEvk-qqkp (Accessed October 15, 2013). 
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/dijalog/skvoteri_pabircenje_i_kralj_mida.46.html?news_id=265656 (Accessed 
August 8, 2013). 
9. A very traditional way of spending free time on the benches in front of the house together with neighbors during 
spring and summer afternoons and nights. In previous times, every small quart or street in the village had its own 
sabor. Today it is mostly practiced by older people, although there are some younger families and persons who 
either gladly join or regularly practice sabor.   
10. The chain of land (lanac zemlje) is a local unit of measurement for land area. A chain of land equals 57.6 ares.  
11. According to my informant, due to increased field thefts and frequent complaints from agricultural producers, 
the council of Gaj village made the decision that gleaning is forbidden from this year on. Only if a person obtains 
signed consent from the landowner will the council allow gleaning. Given the fact that I was not in a situation to 
meet members of the council during my last field visit, I cannot treat this information as fully confirmed. 
However, if the information is correct, this would be the first time that the ban has been delivered on the upper 
council level, because previously the hallmark of forbidden gleaning was, and in some places still is, a scarecrow 
at the very entrance of the certain field which is placed there by the landowner himself.  
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